Walid al-Azhari

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It reflects a broader ideological project aimed at defending a particular historical and political order, then rereading history, theology, and sectarian developments through that lens.

This explains why Ibn Taymiyyah praises the Mu’tazilah when he believes they support his conclusions, condemns them when they do not, cites them when useful, and ignores them when inconvenient.

The constant is not historical truth. The constant is the predetermined conclusion.

The Real Question

The real question is not whether Ibn Taymiyyah made a mistake here or there. Every scholar makes mistakes.

The real question is how often this pattern appears.

How many views did he attribute to others that cannot withstand examination of the original sources?

How many positions did he simplify, reshape, or selectively report in order to support his preferred narrative?

How Did Such a Man Become “Shaykh al-Islam”?

Once such a recurring pattern of omission, distortion, and manipulation becomes evident, a more fundamental question must be asked:

How did such a man come to be called “Shaykh al-Islam”?

How can someone be presented as a model of scholarly fairness while repeatedly misrepresenting the positions of his opponents?

How can someone be treated as an authoritative judge of Islamic sects and intellectual history when his descriptions frequently collapse under scrutiny of the primary sources?

A genuine scholar may make mistakes. A genuine scholar may overlook evidence. A genuine scholar may even reach incorrect conclusions.

But there is a profound difference between ordinary scholarly error and a recurring methodology built upon selective quotation, concealment of inconvenient evidence, and distortion of opposing viewpoints.

Conclusion

Blind trust in Ibn Taymiyyah is not scholarship.

Every claim he makes about another school, sect, or scholar should be verified directly from the original sources.

Academic integrity recognizes no sacred personalities and no immunity from criticism.

And if a man repeatedly misrepresents his opponents, conceals evidence that undermines his arguments, and manipulates historical narratives to persuade readers, then he should not be celebrated as a model of fairness or scholarship. Rather, he should stand as a warning of what happens when ideology takes precedence over truth.

How Did a Fabricator Become “Shaykh al-Islam”?

The Problem with Blind Trust

One of the biggest mistakes many people make is treating Ibn Taymiyyah’s books as reliable sources for understanding the views of other Islamic schools and sects. Yet a careful examination of his citations reveals a recurring pattern of selective quotation, omission, distortion, and reshaping of opposing views to fit conclusions he had already decided upon.

The Case of the Mu’tazilah and Imam Ali

Take the case of the Mu’tazilah.

Ibn Taymiyyah claims that the early Mu’tazilites were undecided regarding the integrity and justice of Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib, and that they did not definitively affirm the correctness of his position during the civil wars.

But when we return to the Mu’tazilite sources themselves, we find something entirely different.

Ibn Abi al-Hadid explicitly states that the Mu’tazilah regarded Ali’s opponents as the aggressors, that the Syrian camp fighting under Mu’awiyah was in rebellion, and that the people of the Camel were doomed unless they repented. In other words, they affirmed Ali’s correctness and did not question his integrity at all.

Distorting the Question of Superiority

Ibn Taymiyyah further claims that the majority of the Mu’tazilah preferred Abu Bakr and Umar over Ali, and that preference for Ali only emerged among later generations.

Yet Mu’tazilite sources state that the Baghdad school, both early and late, overwhelmingly preferred Ali over Abu Bakr. Even among the Basran Mu’tazilah, many leading authorities eventually concluded that Ali was superior, including Abu Ali al-Jubba’i, Qadi Abd al-Jabbar, and Ibn Matwayh.

How does this become “the majority of the Mu’tazilah preferred Abu Bakr and Umar”?

This is not a minor mistake. It is a distortion of historical reality.

The Misrepresentation of Wasil ibn Ata

Even in the case of Wasil ibn Ata, Ibn Taymiyyah presents matters in a misleading way.

He leaves readers with the impression that Wasil was uncertain about Ali’s status. In reality, Wasil’s hesitation concerned the ranking between Ali and the first two caliphs, not Ali’s integrity, righteousness, or correctness.

More importantly, the same sources report that Wasil clearly preferred Ali over Uthman, a fact that Ibn Taymiyyah conveniently omits because it undermines the narrative he wishes to construct.

Quoting Opponents Instead of Primary Sources

A deeper problem emerges here.

Ibn Taymiyyah often does not rely on the primary sources of the groups he discusses. Instead, he frequently relies on their opponents.

He cites figures such as al-Ash’ari, Ibn Hazm, and others describing the Mu’tazilah, then presents those descriptions as though they were the Mu’tazilah’s own positions.

No serious scholar would accept such a methodology.

If you wish to understand Ash’arism, you consult Ash’ari sources. If you wish to understand Mu’tazilism, you consult Mu’tazilite sources. If you wish to understand Twelver Shi’ism, you consult Twelver sources.

Learning a group’s beliefs solely through its enemies is a recipe for distortion and misinformation.

The Double Standard Between Ali and Mu’awiyah

Nor is the issue confined to the Mu’tazilah.

In other places, Ibn Taymiyyah raises doubts concerning the Islam of Imam Ali because Ali accepted Islam as a child. He discusses juristic disputes regarding the validity of a minor’s conversion and creates the impression that Ali’s Islam was somehow questionable.

Yet the Prophet himself accepted Ali’s Islam. None of the Companions questioned it. No one regarded Ali as remaining outside Islam until adulthood.

At the same time, Ibn Taymiyyah vigorously defends Mu’awiyah and treats criticism of him as nearly unacceptable.

Thus the first male youth to embrace Islam becomes the subject of scrutiny, while Mu’awiyah becomes untouchable.

The Political Project Behind the Distortion

This is not simply historical investigation.

Its public continuity, worship, recitation, legal tradition, and communal memory were transmitted through the early Muslim community.

If that entire community is declared apostate, then the public transmission of Islam itself becomes unstable.

This is why such a claim requires certainty, not contested solitary narrations.

It requires decisive proof, not ambiguous wording.

It requires mutawatir evidence, not disputed ahad reports.

Conclusion

The claim that only three Companions remained faithful after the death of the Prophet ﷺ is not established by decisive evidence.

The reports used to support it are solitary, contested, interpretively disputed, and methodologically fragile.

The strongest “except three” report was graded positively by al-Majlisi, but it remains ahad and was not accepted uniformly by later critical sanad-based scholars.

The “small group” report depends on Muhammad ibn Sinan, whose reliability remains heavily disputed. Even according to Sayyid Kamal al-Haydari, who personally accepts Muhammad ibn Sinan, the report still fails to establish mass apostasy because the decisive statement comes from the nephew, not from the Imam.

The Qur’anic verse most commonly cited in support of the claim, Qur’an 3:144, is a conditional warning, not a historical record.

The appeal to previous nations establishes the possibility of division, not the certainty of mass apostasy.

The reports themselves are inconsistent, vague, and incapable of overturning explicit Qur’anic praise of the Muhajirun and Ansar.

The most that can reasonably be established is that disagreements and political conflicts occurred after the Prophet ﷺ. But this is entirely different from claiming that the overwhelming majority of the Companions abandoned Islam itself.

Disagreement is not apostasy.

Political error is not apostasy.

Spiritual failure is not apostasy.

Halak is not automatically riddah.

And a contested ahad report cannot overturn the Qur’an, the transmission of Islam, and the integrity of the generation through whom Allah preserved His religion.

⸻

Footnotes

Rawdat al-Kafi, vol. 15, p. 558, hadith 341; Ikhtiyar Ma‘rifat al-Rijal, Mustafawi edition, p. 36, hadith 12.
Al-Majlisi, Mir’at al-‘Uqul, vol. 26, p. 213, grading the narration as “hasan or muwaththaq.”
Sayyid Kamal al-Haydari states in a lecture that al-Behbudi and Asif Muhsini did not authenticate hadith 341. For al-Behbudi, this is supported by the fact that the report is not included in Sahih al-Kafi.
Usul al-Kafi, vol. 4, p. 243, narration mentioning “nafar yasir” (“a small group”).
Chain of transmission: Muhammad ibn Yahya, from Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Isa, from Muhammad ibn Sinan, from Mu‘awiya ibn Wahb.
Al-Majlisi, Mir’at al-‘Uqul, vol. 11, p. 315: “da‘if ‘ala al-mashhur.”
Sayyid Kamal al-Haydari’s lecture, where he explicitly states: “We accept the trustworthiness of Muhammad ibn Sinan.”
In the narration, the nephew says: “The people apostatized after the Messenger of Allah except for a small group,” while the Imam only confirms the uncle’s status as a man of Paradise.
The argument relies on the premise that what occurred in previous nations occurs in this Ummah “step by step” (hadhw al-na‘l bi-l-na‘l).

This verse is frequently presented as though it proves that the Companions actually turned back after the Prophet’s death ﷺ.

This is a serious logical mistake.

The verse is conditional. It asks: if he dies or is killed, will you turn back?

A conditional statement does not prove that the event actually occurred.

The Qur’an contains many conditional statements that are true in principle without implying that the condition ever happened in reality.

For example:

“If there had been in them gods besides Allah, they would both have been ruined.”
Qur’an 21:22

This does not mean there were multiple gods.

Likewise:

“If you associate others with Allah, your deeds would surely be lost.”
Qur’an 39:65

No Muslim claims this means the Prophet ﷺ committed shirk.

Therefore, Qur’an 3:144 is a warning, not a historical report.

A conditional statement cannot independently establish that mass apostasy actually occurred.

The Shift to Previous Nations Does Not Prove the Claim

When the weakness of using Qur’an 3:144 becomes apparent, the argument sometimes shifts to verses concerning previous nations, such as:

“But they differed; among them were those who believed and among them were those who disbelieved.”
Qur’an 2:253

This is a different kind of evidence entirely.

Qur’an 3:144 is conditional.

Qur’an 2:253 is historical.

This shift itself implicitly acknowledges that Qur’an 3:144 alone does not establish the historical occurrence of apostasy.

But even the appeal to previous nations does not prove the claim.

At most, it establishes that religious communities may divide after the departure of their prophets. It does not prove that the Companions of Muhammad ﷺ abandoned Islam.

To make such an argument work, an additional premise is required: that whatever happened to previous nations must necessarily happen to this Ummah in the same way, “step by step.”⁹

Even if granted, that would prove division, not mass apostasy.

Disagreement is not apostasy.

Political conflict is not apostasy.

Error is not apostasy.

The Reports Are Inconsistent and Vague

The reports themselves are inconsistent.

Some say three remained faithful.

Others mention seven.

Others merely refer to “a small group.”

Some use the word riddah.

Others use halak.

Some are graded positively by one scholar and rejected by another.

Some depend on disputed narrators.

Some are vague in wording and unclear in implication.

If the doctrine were truly certain and foundational, the evidence would be clear, stable, and mutawatir. Instead, the evidence is scattered, contested, and technically fragile.

Qur’anic Praise of the Muhajirun and Ansar

Any discussion of the Companions must ultimately be read in light of the Qur’an itself.

Allah says:

“And the first forerunners among the Muhajirun and the Ansar and those who followed them with excellence, Allah is pleased with them and they are pleased with Him.”
Qur’an 9:100

Allah also says:

“Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah. Those with him are firm against the disbelievers, merciful among themselves…”
Qur’an 48:29

And He says regarding the Muhajirun and Ansar:

“For the poor emigrants who were expelled from their homes and their wealth, seeking bounty from Allah and His pleasure, and supporting Allah and His Messenger. Those are the truthful.”
Qur’an 59:8

These verses establish explicit Qur’anic praise for the early believers.

Therefore, any narration that appears to condemn the overwhelming majority of them must be approached with extreme caution.

Weak, ahad, vague, disputed, or interpretively ambiguous narrations cannot overturn explicit Qur’anic praise.

The Theological Consequences of the Claim

The most serious problem with the mass apostasy narrative is its implication.

If almost all the Companions apostatized after the Prophet ﷺ, then who transmitted Islam?

Who preserved the Qur’an?

Who transmitted the prayer?

Who taught fasting, zakah, and hajj?

Who carried the Sunnah?

Who conveyed Islam to the next generation?

Islam did not reach the Ummah through three isolated individuals alone.

Therefore, a narration cannot become certain merely because it is repeated in later books if its earlier transmission remains singular or contested.

The reports concerning the alleged apostasy of the Companions do not meet the technical conditions of tawatur. They remain solitary reports, ahad, and therefore cannot establish certainty in a matter of such enormous theological significance.

The Primary Reports and Their Problems

The “Except Three” Report

The most famous narration appears in Rawdat al-Kafi and Ikhtiyar Ma‘rifat al-Rijal and explicitly states:

“People became people of apostasy after the Prophet ﷺ except for three: al-Miqdad ibn al-Aswad, Abu Dharr al-Ghifari, and Salman al-Farsi.”¹

This is the strongest and most explicit report used in support of the mass apostasy narrative.

Al-Majlisi graded this narration in Mir’at al-‘Uqul as “hasan or muwaththaq.”² This point must be stated accurately. He did not weaken this particular narration.

However, that does not make the report decisive.

First, the narration remains ahad, not mutawatir.

Second, stricter sanad-based scholars such as al-Behbudi did not include it in Sahih al-Kafi, and Sayyid Kamal al-Haydari states in his lecture that both al-Behbudi and Asif Muhsini did not authenticate it.³

Third, even if accepted as technically admissible, it still cannot independently overturn explicit Qur’anic praise of the Muhajirun and Ansar, nor can it establish mass legal apostasy for the entire first generation of Muslims.

A solitary report, even one graded positively by al-Majlisi, cannot bear the weight of such a sweeping theological conclusion.

The “Small Group” Report and Muhammad ibn Sinan

A separate narration appears in Usul al-Kafi and speaks not of “three,” but of “a small group,” nafar yasir.⁴

This report contains the chain:

Muhammad ibn Yahya
from Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Isa
from Muhammad ibn Sinan
from Mu‘awiya ibn Wahb.⁵

Unlike the previous narration, this report depends heavily on Muhammad ibn Sinan, who is among the most disputed narrators in Shi‘i rijal criticism.

The majority view, al-mashhur, weakens Muhammad ibn Sinan and does not consider him trustworthy. For this reason, al-Majlisi described the report as “weak according to the famous view,” da‘if ‘ala al-mashhur.⁶

Sayyid Kamal al-Haydari, however, explicitly states that he personally accepts the trustworthiness of Muhammad ibn Sinan and therefore considers the narration technically mu‘tabar according to his methodological framework.⁷

Yet even after accepting the sanad, al-Haydari still critiques the report’s evidentiary value.

The narration itself contains a major matn problem: the statement about apostasy comes from the nephew speaking to his dying uncle, not directly from the Imam himself. The Imam confirms the uncle’s salvation but does not explicitly endorse the nephew’s claim that the Ummah apostatized.⁸

Thus, even under the more generous methodology, the report remains vague and insufficient to establish the doctrine being claimed.

The Distinction Between Halak and Riddah

Another major problem lies in the careless treatment of terminology.

Some reports speak of people “perishing,” halak. But halak is not synonymous with legal riddah.

Halak may refer to spiritual ruin, moral failure, severe blameworthiness, or loss in the Hereafter. Riddah, however, is a precise legal and theological category referring to apostasy from Islam.

This distinction is essential because legal apostasy carries enormous theological and jurisprudential consequences.

A report saying “people perished except three” cannot automatically be transformed into “people became apostates except three.”

To do so is to move from vague spiritual language to a legal and theological judgment without sufficient proof.

The Misuse of Qur’an 3:144

One of the most commonly cited Qur’anic verses in support of the mass apostasy narrative is:

“Muhammad is no more than a messenger. Messengers have passed away before him. So if he dies or is killed, will you turn back on your heels?”
Qur’an 3:144

Did the Companions Apostatize After the Prophet ﷺ? A Methodological Critique of the “Except Three” Narrative

Introduction 

This article examines the positions of prominent Twelver Shi‘i scholars regarding the famous “except three” narrations and argues that even within the Shi‘i scholarly tradition, the claim of mass apostasy after the Prophet ﷺ is far from unanimously accepted. Rather than relying on polemical caricatures, the discussion engages directly with the methodological critiques raised by respected Imami scholars themselves, especially Sayyid Kamal al-Haydari, whose lectures and writings are repeatedly cited throughout this study. Al-Haydari is not an outsider to the tradition, but a well-known contemporary Imami scholar who approaches these narrations through the tools of hadith criticism, rijal analysis, and theological scrutiny. By examining the issue through the lens of Shi‘i scholarship itself, this article demonstrates that the sweeping claim that nearly all the Companions apostatized cannot be treated as an uncontested or definitive doctrine even among leading Shi‘i authorities.

The Claim

Among the most serious claims repeated in some Twelver Shi‘i polemical discourse is the allegation that after the death of the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ, the overwhelming majority of his Companions apostatized, and only a tiny minority remained faithful, often reduced to three individuals: Salman al-Farsi, Abu Dharr al-Ghifari, and al-Miqdad ibn al-Aswad.

This is not a minor historical question. Nor is it merely a disagreement over politics or succession. If accepted in its extreme literal sense, the claim would redefine the entire first generation of Islam and cast doubt upon the very generation through whom the Qur’an, Sunnah, prayer, fasting, zakah, hajj, and the public continuity of Islam reached the Ummah.

For that reason, such a claim requires the highest standard of evidence.

The issue is not whether political disputes occurred after the Prophet ﷺ. No serious historian denies that disagreements, tensions, and conflicts emerged. The real question is much more precise:

Do the sources actually prove that the overwhelming majority of the Prophet’s Companions abandoned Islam itself?

When examined through hadith methodology, rijal criticism, logical analysis, and linguistic precision, the answer is no.

The Confusion Between Political Error and Apostasy

A major methodological flaw in many polemical presentations is the conflation of distinct categories.

Political disagreement is not the same as apostasy.

Delayed bay‘ah is not the same as apostasy.

Failure to recognize a claimed rank is not the same as apostasy.

Sin is not the same as apostasy.

Spiritual failure is not the same as apostasy.

Misguidance is not automatically apostasy.

Halak, or “perishing,” is not automatically riddah, or legal apostasy.

These distinctions matter enormously because the narrations often move between such categories fluidly until the emotional conclusion “the Companions apostatized” is assumed without rigorous proof.

A person may be mistaken, sinful, politically blameworthy, spiritually deficient, or deserving criticism without being outside Islam.

Therefore, any report used to establish mass apostasy must contain clear wording, decisive meaning, and sound transmission. Vague language or interpretive exaggeration is insufficient.

The Reports Are Not Mutawatir

One of the central claims often repeated is that the reports about mass apostasy are mutawatir. This claim does not withstand technical scrutiny.

Tawatur is not established merely because a report is famous or widely repeated. A report only becomes mutawatir when every layer of transmission contains such a large number of narrators that collusion upon falsehood becomes impossible.

If even one layer depends on solitary transmission, the report remains ahad.

This is a foundational principle in hadith methodology: the conclusion follows the weakest layer of transmission.

The truth is that Ahl al-Bayt are far too noble to have their names used to sanctify political systems or preserve sectarian myths.

Ja‘far al-Sadiq was a great Imam of knowledge, guidance, and piety.

But turning him into the centerpiece of an esoteric doctrine built upon infallibility, hidden knowledge, secret designation, condemnation of the majority of the Ummah, and the use of taqiyyah to neutralize all contradictory evidence, bears little resemblance to early Islam, to the spirit of Ahl al-Bayt, or to Ja‘far al-Sadiq himself.

The conclusion is simple:

Ja‘far al-Sadiq was one of the great Imams of the Prophet’s family, and we love and honor him deeply.

But the later Twelver theory of Imamate is not his religion.

It is a collection of sectarian myths and exaggerations falsely attributed to Ahl al-Bayt, which later evolved into both a theological system and a political ideology.

He denies knowledge of the unseen? Taqiyyah.

He denies divine Imamate? Taqiyyah.

He condemns extremists? Taqiyyah.

He shows respect toward Abu Bakr and ‘Umar? Taqiyyah.

He fails to clearly designate an Imam after himself? Taqiyyah.

At this point the entire methodology collapses.

Because any explicit statement can instantly be dismissed by claiming it was spoken under concealment.

The “real doctrine” thus becomes only the hidden narrations that support the theory, while clear public statements are discarded whenever inconvenient.

This is not a search for truth. It is a mechanism for protecting a preconceived doctrine regardless of evidence.

Even historically, the theory ran into a massive crisis after the death of Hasan al-‘Askari without a publicly known son leading the community.

Instead of a visible infallible Imam governing the Ummah as the doctrine claims, the idea of the Hidden Imam emerged as a solution to the crisis.

Then occultation itself became a central doctrine.

So where is the Imam who is supposed to guide humanity?

Where is the visible divine leadership?

Where is the Imamate claimed to be a pillar of religion?

In the end, the doctrine transformed into an indefinite waiting period lasting centuries.

What is even more striking is that some defenders of the doctrine attempt to rely on the hadith found in Sunni collections stating that there will be twelve leaders from Quraysh after the Prophet ﷺ.

But this argument actually works against them.

The hadith does not say these leaders are infallible Imams.

It does not say they are divinely appointed by name.

It does not say they are descendants of al-Husayn.

It does not say they are specifically from Ahl al-Bayt.

It does not mention occultation.

It does not say the twelve must appear consecutively without interruption.

And it certainly does not say that the twelfth Imam would disappear for centuries and return later.

All of these are later sectarian additions imposed onto the hadith.

The irony becomes even greater when we remember that this hadith comes through Sunni narrators whom Twelver Shi‘is themselves often accuse of dishonesty or deviation.

So how can a foundational doctrine be built upon narrations transmitted by people they themselves reject?

If those narrators are liars, then their narrations cannot serve as the foundation of religion.

And if they are truthful here, then why reject them elsewhere?

Even if we accepted the hadith at face value, it merely states that twelve leaders from Quraysh would appear in Muslim history. Turning this into proof for Twelver Imamate, infallibility, occultation, hereditary succession, and secret divine designation is reading an entire sectarian system into a text that simply does not contain it.

This reveals something important:

The doctrine does not rest upon a single clear unequivocal text. Rather, it relies on assembling vague references and then projecting an enormous theological system onto them afterward.

More importantly, this theory is not only false intellectually. It effectively collapsed centuries ago in practice.

The doctrine of a visible divinely appointed infallible Imam ended the moment occultation began.

Since then, there has been no accessible Imam leading the Ummah, no direct infallible authority, and no functioning divine political order as the theory claims.

Yet some modern regimes and political movements continue trying to keep this doctrine alive, not because it still functions, but because it became politically useful.

The survival of certain ruling structures depends upon people continuing to believe in it, because it grants religious legitimacy, merges politics with theology, and turns opposition to the regime into opposition against a sacred extension of religion itself.

Thus Imamate transformed from a theological claim into a political project.

From a doctrine that historically collapsed into a mechanism for maintaining sectarian loyalty and political authority.

Did Imam Ja‘far al-Sadiq Actually Believe in the Twelver Shi‘i Theory of Imamate?

The clear answer is: no.

In fact, the Twelver theory of Imamate, in its later theological form, does not appear to be a natural extension of Imam Ja‘far al-Sadiq’s actual teachings. Rather, it appears to be a later sectarian construct shaped by exaggeration, esoteric reinterpretation, fabricated narrations, and later theological development, until it eventually evolved into both a religious doctrine and a political instrument.

The Twelver theory of Imamate rests on several major claims:

That the Imam is divinely appointed by God.

That obedience to him is obligatory.

That he is infallible.

That he possesses special knowledge unavailable to ordinary scholars.

And that leadership is inherited through a closed hereditary line.

But when we examine what is actually narrated from Ja‘far al-Sadiq himself, we find a completely different picture.

He is reported to have denied being an Imam whose obedience is divinely imposed.

This is not a minor point. It strikes at the very foundation of the theory.

Because Twelver Imamate is not merely love of Ahl al-Bayt. It is the claim that God specifically appointed certain individuals to rule the Muslim community, and that belief in them is a core pillar of religion.

If Ja‘far himself did not present himself this way, then where did the doctrine come from?

Then there is the issue of knowledge of the unseen.

Ja‘far al-Sadiq reportedly said clearly:

“No one knows the unseen except Allah.”

And he did not stop at theoretical denial. Narrations describe ordinary situations from his own life proving his human limitations:

A servant girl fled and he did not know where she went.

Land was divided and he did not select the better portion for himself.

He reportedly remarked that had he known the unseen, he would have chosen the better land.

These are not insignificant details.

They completely undermine the mythological image later built around the Imams.

Here, Ja‘far presents himself not as a superhuman figure, nor as a cosmic being with hidden knowledge, but as a scholar from the Prophet’s household whose knowledge comes from narrating the teachings of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ, not from new revelation.

In fact, Ja‘far himself reportedly complained about liars fabricating statements in his name.

He warned against extremists.

He cursed some of them.

One of the most important examples is al-Mughira ibn Sa‘id, who was accused of inserting fabricated extremist narrations into the books of the companions of Imam al-Baqir and then falsely attributing them to the Imams.

At this point the picture starts becoming clearer:

We have an Imam fighting exaggeration, while later literature becomes filled with exaggerated claims attributed to him.

So is it really reasonable to treat every extreme narration attributed to Ahl al-Bayt as unquestionable religion, when the Imam himself warned against fabricators and infiltrators?

Then there is the issue of the Mufawwida.

These were extremists who elevated the Imams beyond human limits and claimed that God delegated to them control over creation and worldly affairs.

And here an important distinction must be made.

If someone merely means that Allah may honor certain saints with miracles while all real power, creation, and causation remain entirely Allah’s alone, then this falls within the traditional understanding of karamat acknowledged by many Sunni Sufis.

But if the claim is that Allah created the universe and does not care about it and then delegated independent or semi-independent control of creation, provision, life, and death to the Imams, then this is outright shirk.

And Ja‘far al-Sadiq himself reportedly fought this idea and used Qur’anic verses to refute it:

“Allah is the One who created you, then provided for you, then causes you to die, then gives you life.”

And:

“Say: Allah is the Creator of all things.”

Then comes another major problem:

Whenever a narration from Ja‘far destroys the theory, the response becomes: taqiyyah.

It is not permissible to give that to a rich person, nor to a person of noble rank, lineage, or knowledge, unless he is poor. It has not been established in the Sacred Law that it is permissible to give such vows to the rich, due to consensus on the unlawfulness of making vows to created beings. Such a vow is not contracted, and one’s liability is not engaged by it, because it is unlawful. Rather, it is illicit gain. It is not permissible for the servant of the shaykh to take it unless he is poor, or has poor dependants who are unable to provide for themselves. In that case, they may take it as an initial charity.

Even taking it is disliked unless the one making the vow intends drawing near to Allah Most High and spending it upon the poor, while disregarding the vow to the shaykh. This is from al-Bahr, summarised from the commentary of the scholar Qasim.

His saying, “unless they intend,” and so on, means that the wording of the vow is to Allah Most High, in order to draw near to Him, and that the mention of the shaykh means his poor, as has preceded. It is not hidden that he may spend it upon others besides them, as has passed earlier. The thing vowed must also be something by which a vow is valid, such as charity in dirhams and the like.

As for if he vows oil to light a lamp above the tomb of the shaykh, or in the minaret, as women do when they vow oil for Sayyidi Abd al-Qadir and it is lit in the minaret on the eastern side, then this is invalid.

Worse than that is the vow to recite the Mawlid on pulpits, along with what it contains of singing and play, and gifting the reward of that to the presence of the Chosen One, peace and blessings be upon him.

His saying, “especially in these times,” means especially in the Mawlid of Sayyid Ahmad al-Badawi. This is from al-Nahr.

His saying, “and indeed he said,” and so on, was mentioned here in al-Nahr. It is not hidden from people of understanding that what the Imam intended by this statement was only to criticise the common people and to distance himself from being attributed to them in any possible way, even by dropping the bond of patronage that had been firmly established. This is due to their widespread ignorance, their changing of many rulings, and their seeking nearness through what is invalid and unlawful. They are like cattle, through whom landmarks are altered, and the scholars disavow their enormous offences, just as is the etiquette of the noble Prophets, who disavowed distant and close relatives when they opposed the Sovereign, the All-Knowing. So understand what we have mentioned, and peace.

Al-Durr al-Mukhtar wa Hashiyat Ibn Abidin, Radd al-Muhtar, 2/440.

Reference: The Exact Passage from Radd al-Muhtar

مطلب في النذر الذي يقع للأموات من أكثر العوام من شمع أو زيت أو نحوه

(قوله تقربا إليهم) كأن يقول يا سيدي فلان إن رد غائبي أو عوفي مريضي أو قضيت حاجتي فلك من الذهب أو الفضة أو من الطعام أو الشمع أو الزيت كذا بحر.

(قوله باطل وحرام) لوجوه: منها أنه نذر لمخلوق والنذر للمخلوق لا يجوز لأنه عبادة والعبادة لا تكون لمخلوق. ومنها أن المنذور له ميت والميت لا يملك.

ومنه أنه إن ظن أن الميت يتصرف في الأمور دون الله تعالى واعتقاده ذلك كفر، اللهم إلا إن قال يا الله إني نذرت لك إن شفيت مريضي أو رددت غائبي أو قضيت حاجتي أن أطعم الفقراء الذين بباب السيدة نفيسة أو الإمام الشافعي أو الإمام الليث أو اشترى حصرا لمساجدهم أو زيتا لوقودها أو دراهم لمن يقوم بشعائرها إلى غير ذلك مما يكون فيه نفع للفقراء والنذر لله عز وجل وذكر الشيخ إنما هو محل لصرف النذر لمستحقيه القاطنين برباطه أو مسجده فيجوز بهذا الاعتبار، ولا يجوز أن يصرف ذلك لغني ولا لشريف منصب أو ذي نسب أو علم، ما لم يكن فقيرا ولم يثبت في الشرع جواز الصرف للأغنياء للإجماع على حرمة النذر للمخلوق، ولا ينعقد ولا تشتغل الذمة به ولأنه حرام بل سحت ولا يجوز لخادم الشيخ أخذه إلا أن يكون فقيرا أو له عيال فقراء عاجزون فيأخذونه على سبيل الصدقة المبتدأة، وأخذه أيضا مكروه ما لم يقصد الناذر التقرب إلى الله تعالى وصرفه إلى الفقراء، ويقطع النظر عن نذر الشيخ بحر ملخصا عن شرح العلامة قاسم.

(قوله ما لم يقصدوا إلخ) أي بأن تكون صيغة النذر لله تعالى للتقرب إليه ويكون ذكر الشيخ مرادا به فقراؤه كما مر، ولا يخفى أن له الصرف إلى غيرهم كما مر سابقا ولا بد أن يكون المنذور مما يصح به النذر كالصدقة بالدراهم ونحوها، أما لو نذر زيتا لإيقاد قنديل فوق ضريح الشيخ أو في المنارة كما يفعل النساء من نذر الزيت لسيدي عبد القادر ويوقد في المنارة جهة المشرق فهو باطل، وأقبح منه النذر بقراءة المولد في المنابر ومع اشتماله على الغناء واللعب وإيهاب ثواب ذلك إلى حضرة المصطفى صلى الله عليه وسلم.

(قوله ولا سيما في هذه الأعصار) ولا سيما في مولد السيد أحمد البدوي نهر.

(قوله ولقد قال إلخ) ذكر ذلك هنا في النهر، ولا يخفى على ذوي الأفهام أن مراد الإمام بهذا الكلام إنما هو ذم العوام والتباعد عن نسبتهم إليه بأي وجه يرام ولو بإسقاط الولاء الثابت الانبرام، وذلك بسبب جهلهم العام وتغييرهم لكثير من الأحكام، وتقربهم بما هو باطل وحرام؛ فهم كالأنعام يتغير بهم الأعلام، ويتبرءون من شنائعهم العظام كما هو أدب الأنبياء الكرام حيث يتبرءون من الأباعد والأرحام بمخالفتهم الملك العلام فافهم ما ذكرناه والسلام.

الدر المختار وحاشية ابن عابدين، رد المحتار، 2/440.

English Translation

A section concerning the vow that occurs among many of the common people for the dead, such as candles, oil, and the like.

His saying, “as a means of drawing near to them,” means, for example, that one says: “O my master so-and-so, if my absent one is returned, or my sick one is cured, or my need is fulfilled, then for you is such-and-such of gold, silver, food, candles, or oil.” This is from al-Bahr.

His saying, “invalid and unlawful,” is for several reasons. Among them is that it is a vow to a created being, and a vow to a created being is not permissible because it is worship, and worship cannot be for a created being. Among them also is that the one to whom the vow is made is dead, and the dead do not own property.

Among them also is that if he believes that the dead person disposes of affairs independently of Allah Most High, then his belief in that is disbelief.

This is unless he says: “O Allah, I have vowed to You that if You cure my sick person, or return my absent one, or fulfil my need, I will feed the poor who are at the door of Sayyida Nafisa, or Imam al-Shafi‘i, or Imam al-Layth, or I will buy mats for their mosques, or oil for their lamps, or money for whoever maintains their religious services,” and other such matters in which there is benefit for the poor. In that case, the vow is to Allah Mighty and Majestic, and the mention of the shaykh is only the place where the vow is to be spent upon those entitled to receive it, who reside in his hospice or mosque. So it is permissible from this perspective.

On What the Passage Can and Cannot Prove About Mawlid

It should also be noted that Ibn Abidin’s criticism in the vow passage is not a criticism of Mawlid as such. Where he criticises a vow to recite Mawlid, he is speaking about a corrupt vowed practice attached to unlawful or blameworthy elements, such as singing, play, improper conduct, and the invalidity of vowing in that form.

That cannot honestly be turned into a general condemnation of Mawlid. At most, the passage condemns a specific corrupt form of vowed Mawlid practice, where the vow itself is invalid and where the gathering is attached to objectionable elements. It does not say that every Mawlid gathering is forbidden, nor does it establish Ibn Abidin as an opponent of Mawlid as a devotional commemoration.

This distinction is especially important because Ibn Abidin himself does not treat every newly introduced matter as automatically forbidden. In his Hashiya, he states:

فقد تكون البدعة واجبة كنصب الأدلة للرد على أهل الفرق الضالة، وتعلّم النحو المفهم للكتاب والسنة، ومندوبة كإحداث نحو رباط ومدرسة، وكل إحسان لم يكن في الصدر الأول، ومكروهة كزخرفة المساجد، ومباحة كالتوسع بلذيذ المآكل والمشارب والثياب.

“An innovation may be obligatory, such as establishing proofs to refute the people of deviant sects, and learning grammar by which the Book and the Sunnah are understood; recommended, such as establishing a hospice or school, and every act of goodness that did not exist in the earliest period; disliked, such as decorating mosques; and permissible, such as expansion in pleasant foods, drinks, and clothing.”

So the mere fact that a practice was not present in the earliest period does not, for Ibn Abidin, make it forbidden. The question is what the practice contains, how it is formulated, and whether it falls under a sound religious meaning or under unlawful elements. Therefore, using the vow passage as a blanket anti-Mawlid proof is methodologically flawed. The actual subject of the passage is invalid vows, misdirected devotional formulations, unlawful expenditure, and corrupt popular practices. It is not a general legal chapter on the permissibility or impermissibility of Mawlid.

The Pattern, and the Responsibility It Carries

What we see here is a consistent methodology: take a passage from a classical scholar, strip it of its legal context, expand its scope beyond what the author was discussing, and present the result as an authoritative condemnation of a practice that the passage itself does not actually address in general terms.

Let us be precise about what this means. The vow passage in Radd al-Muhtar cannot honestly be presented as Ibn Abidin’s general position against Mawlid. Its criticism is directed at a specific invalid vow and at a corrupt form involving unlawful or blameworthy elements. This is especially clear when read alongside Ibn Abidin’s own broader classification of innovation, where he explicitly recognises that some innovations are obligatory, some recommended, some disliked, and some merely permissible.

Anyone presenting the vow passage as a general anti-Mawlid proof has a duty to show that Ibn Abidin was speaking about Mawlid itself, rather than about a corrupted vowed practice. The passage does not establish that.

Correction Note

An earlier version of this post attributed to Muhammad Amin Ibn Abidin, the author of Radd al-Muhtar, a pro-Mawlid statement and a commentary on Ibn Hajar’s Mawlid. On checking the attribution, the commentary appears to belong to Ahmad ibn Abd al-Ghani ibn Umar Ibn Abidin, a later scholar from the same family. I have therefore removed that material from the argument.

The central point remains unchanged: the passage in Radd al-Muhtar concerns invalid vows, corrupt formulations, and objectionable practices attached to certain gatherings. It does not amount to a blanket condemnation of Mawlid itself.

Ibn Abidin on Mawlid and Vows: Setting the Record Straight

A passage from Radd al-Muhtar has been circulating in certain circles as evidence against two things: the celebration of Mawlid, and the practice of vows connected to the Awliya. Neither use of the passage survives a careful reading of Ibn Abidin’s actual works. What follows is a correction of the record on both points.

On the Vow Passage: What It Actually Says

The passage appears in the chapter on vows made by common people to the deceased, involving candles, oil, and similar offerings. Ibn Abidin rules such vows invalid, and he is explicit about the precise reason: the people he is addressing direct their vows to the deceased directly, saying: “O Sayyidi so-and-so, if my absent one returns or my sick one recovers, then for you is such-and-such.”

The theological problem is not mere association with the Awliya. It is the formulation and intention by which the vow is directed to a created being rather than to Allah. A vow is an act of worship, and worship cannot be directed to a created being.

This must be distinguished clearly from what is entirely valid and established in the tradition: gifting the reward of a good deed to a deceased person so that the benefit reaches them. Performing a charitable act, reciting Qur’an, feeding the poor, and then gifting the reward to a deceased Wali or loved one is sound practice with deep roots in the school. Ibn Abidin is not condemning this. He is condemning a specific misdirected formulation in which the deceased is addressed as the granting agent.

Indeed, even within the same discussion, the correction is not to sever all connection to the Awliya, nor to condemn people wholesale. The correction is to direct the vow to Allah alone, and to make any mention of the Wali merely descriptive, such as identifying the place, the poor who will receive the charity, or the reward that will be gifted. That is a very different matter from directing the vow itself to the deceased.

On Takfir, and the Contrast with Wahhabism

This is where the passage becomes particularly instructive. Ibn Abidin does acknowledge that if a person genuinely believes the deceased acts independently of Allah, that belief is kufr in its doctrinal character. However, and this is the point that defines the Hanafi tradition’s pastoral spirit, he does not declare these common people kafir. He recognises that many act out of ignorance and misguided love rather than considered theological conviction. He corrects them, guides them toward the valid formulation, and treats them as Muslims in need of instruction, not apostates deserving condemnation.

Contrast this with the Wahhabi movement that emerged in the Arabian Peninsula in the 18th century. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and the political alliance that enforced his positions did not respond to these same popular practices with scholarly correction and pastoral mercy. They declared ordinary Muslim populations of the Hijaz and beyond to be mushrikeen and kafir on the basis of shrine visitation, tawassul, and related devotional practices, and acted on those declarations with violence.

The sacking of Karbala in 1802, the destruction of shrines across the Hijaz, and the massacres of Muslim populations who held precisely the kinds of confused popular beliefs that scholars such as Ibn Abidin were correcting: these were the consequences of a tradition that reached for takfir where the Hanafi school reached for guidance.

One method corrects invalid formulations while preserving the Islam of the people. The other historically turned disputed practices into grounds for takfir and violence, with Karbala standing as one of its darkest examples.

When certain Asian circles today deploy Ibn Abidin’s words to condemn and exclude, while showing none of his mercy toward those they judge, they reveal which tradition they have actually absorbed, regardless of the label they carry.

On Ibn Abidin’s Position on Mawlid

In these circles, both have become instruments of exclusion applied with alarming lightness. Muslims who celebrate the Prophet ﷺ, seek intercession through the Awliya – a practice affirmed by fourteen centuries of Ahl al-Sunna scholarship – visit the graves of the righteous, or participate in dhikr gatherings are accused of heresy. Scholars who disagree are dismissed as deviant. The result is not a deepening of faith but a fracturing of communities – people divided from their families, their heritage, and their own spiritual instincts by rulings the mainstream tradition has never endorsed.

The Hanafite school does not produce this. A tradition built on If’al wa la haraj – do it, and there is no harm – does not end in the casual condemnation of those who love their Prophet and honour their dead.

A Word to Those Affected

If you were told that practices your family observed for generations were wrong, or that your love for the Prophet ﷺ needed to be curtailed – know that the mainstream scholarly tradition, anchored in Al-Azhar and the great Hanafite chairs of the Arab world, does not share that judgment. What was handed to you in the name of the school is not the school.

Many readers will recognise the school this piece describes without needing it named. That recognition is intentional. This is not about institutions or individuals – it is about a methodology.

If your circle declares the Mawlid a forbidden innovation, forbids intercession through the Awliya despite fourteen centuries of scholarly consensus permitting it, dismisses devotional practices your forebears observed without question, and reaches for takfir where the classical tradition called for caution – then this piece is addressed to you. Not in condemnation, but in invitation. The door back to the authentic tradition remains open.

How Certain Asian Circles Narrowed the Hanafite School – and What Was Lost

This article is a follow-up to my previous piece on the Hanafite school, prompted by a question from a reader asking for concrete examples of how certain Asian circles have narrowed the tradition. I will try to make it as clear as day.

This piece is addressed first and foremost to ordinary Muslims – those who have sat in circles where religion felt heavy, where questions were met with suspicion, and where practices their grandparents observed without controversy were suddenly declared forbidden or innovated. If that has been your experience, this article is an attempt to explain what happened and where it came from.

The Narrowing Was Not Inevitable

The Hanafite school, as it developed across Arab lands, Central Asia, and the Ottoman world, carried within it a remarkable tolerance for local custom, devotional practice, and interpretive diversity. Scholars debated openly. Muftis exercised genuine discretion.

What emerged in certain subcontinental Asian circles over the past century and a half was something different – a gradual tightening of what counted as valid reasoning, which opinions were considered authoritative, and which practices were deemed acceptable.

Two mechanisms drove this more than any other.
The first was the sidelining of urf – the principle that prevailing custom carries legal weight and can shape how general rulings are applied. Classical Hanafite jurisprudence treated custom as a living source of legal specification. When a practice was deeply embedded in a community and carried no clear harm, it was accommodated and protected. In these circles, that principle was quietly abandoned. Rulings adapted to local conditions for centuries were stripped of their customary context and declared problematic. Communities were told their grandparents had been wrong.

The second was the hardening of taqlid into something the classical imams never intended. The school deliberately preserved diverse transmitted opinions so that scholars could select what served people best. What hardened in certain circles was a rigid insistence on a single transmitted opinion, typically the most restrictive one available, applied without the discretionary judgment the classical tradition always exercised.

Wahhabi Conclusions in Hanafite Clothing

Perhaps the most troubling dimension of this trend is not the narrowing itself but how it has been dressed. Certain voices within these circles have adopted positions indistinguishable in substance and reasoning from Wahhabi jurisprudence – yet continue to present themselves under the banner of Ahl al-Sunna and the Hanafite school. The label is retained while the methodology is replaced.
Ordinary Muslims, trusting they are receiving guidance from within their own tradition, have no way of knowing that what is being handed to them has been quietly substituted. Rulings the classical Hanafite tradition never produced are delivered with the full weight of scholarly authority. The deception, whether conscious or not, is real in its effects.

A clear example is the Mawlid. For centuries across the Arab world, Central Asia, and the Ottoman lands, gatherings to celebrate the Prophet’s birth ﷺ were occasions of communal joy, poetry, and renewal of prophetic love – attended and endorsed by great Hanafite scholars. In certain subcontinental circles, this practice was reclassified as forbidden innovation, using arguments borrowed from literalist frameworks foreign to the school. Families who had gathered for generations to hear the Prophet’s ﷺ story recited suddenly found themselves accused of sin. The pastoral damage – the confusion, the family ruptures, the estrangement from religious practice – is still felt.

The Weaponisation of Bid’a and Takfir

In the classical tradition, the charge of bid’a and the graver act of takfir were handled with extraordinary caution. The bar was high, the analysis careful, and the stakes understood.

But I pledged loyalty, without doubt, to the best Imam and guide
If loving the guardian is Rafidism, then I am a Rafidi before mankind

This poetry is authentically attributed to him and affirms that devotion to Ali and Ahl al-Bayt is not deviation, but religion.

7. The explicit statement of Ahmad ibn al-Siddiq al-Ghumari

Among the clearest articulations is that of the Sunni hadith master Ahmad ibn al-Siddiq al-Ghumari, who stated:

“In my belief, the best of people after the Messenger of God ﷺ is his daughter Fatima, then Ali, then al-Hasan and al-Husayn, then the wives of the Prophet ﷺ, then the Companions.”
(al-Jawab al-Mufid li-l-Sa’il al-Mustafid)

This statement is unequivocal. It establishes:
• The precedence of Ahl al-Bayt as a category
• The ranking of the Companions occurring after them

Conclusion
• Ranking virtue according to political succession is not a Sunni consensus
• It is a politically generated doctrine, later normalized through repetition
• The authentic Sunni methodology affirms:
• Ahl al-Bayt as a distinct, incomparable rank
• The Companions ranked after them
• Abu Bakr as the best of the Companions

Loving Ali, preferring him, and affirming his unique station is not Rafidism.
It is a forgotten Sunni tradition, restored through evidence, not ideology.

Summary for those who will not read the full post

The claim that Sunni Islam unanimously agreed that virtue follows the order of the caliphate is false. It is a political doctrine that originated under Umayyad and later Abbasid rule and spread through repetition, not verification.

Major Sunni authorities explicitly contradict it:
• Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal stated clearly that
“Ali belongs to the Household of the Prophet; no one is comparable to them.”
Meaning that Ali is outside the competitive ranking of the Companions altogether.
• The hadith master Ahmad ibn al-Siddiq al-Ghumari stated explicitly:
“In my belief, the best of people after the Messenger of God ﷺ is his daughter Fatima, then Ali, then al-Hasan and al-Husayn, then the wives of the Prophet ﷺ, then the Companions.”

This establishes that Ahl al-Bayt constitute a distinct rank of virtue, preceding the Companions, after which Abu Bakr is the most virtuous of the Companions.
The claim that virtue must mirror political succession and that this represents a Sunni consensus is therefore unsustainable.

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The claim of a Sunni consensus equating virtue with the order of the caliphate is false

One of the most repeated assertions in modern Sunni discourse is that the Sunni tradition unanimously agreed that virtue follows the political succession: Abu Bakr, then Umar, then Uthman, then Ali.

This claim is neither historically nor academically sound. Its origin lies in Umayyad and later Abbasid political theology, and its persistence is the result of imitation and uncritical transmission of a supposed consensus that was never rigorously established.

1. “Consensus” here is a claim, not a reality

In Sunni legal theory, consensus requires:
• Agreement of the scholars of the era
• Absence of any معتبر (recognized) disagreement
• Clear, reliable transmission

None of these conditions are met in the issue of comparative virtue, which was widely disputed from the earliest generations.

2. Preference for Ali among the Companions was widespread

Preference for Ali ibn Abi Talib was not a marginal view.

Ibn Hazm and others transmitted, with sound chains, the preference of more than twenty Companions who held Ali to be superior to others. This is critical:
• This does not mean only those twenty held this view
• Rather, such breadth of transmission indicates a dominant early perception
• No comparable body of early reports exists, in number and distribution, explicitly preferring Abu Bakr over Ali in the same manner

3. This does not negate Abu Bakr’s virtue

Affirming Ali’s precedence does not deny Abu Bakr’s excellence.

The key distinction is rank:
• Ahl al-Bayt occupy a different category altogether
• Reports ranking Companions do not apply to them

This is like saying:

“The top student in the class is X.”
This does not mean X is superior to the teacher.

Different categories invalidate the comparison.

4. This is exactly what Imam Ahmad intended

Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal famously said:

“The Household of the Prophet cannot be compared to anyone.”

Ibn al-Jawzi and Ibn al-Farra’ narrate that Abdullah ibn Ahmad asked his father:
• Who is the best of people after the Messenger of God?
• Abu Bakr
• Then Umar
• Then Uthman
• Then Ali?
• Imam Ahmad replied:
“My son, Ali is from the Household of the Prophet; no one is comparable to them.”

This statement explicitly removes Ali from the ranking of the Companions.

5. Revelation places Ahl al-Bayt in a distinct rank

This is established by:
• The Verse of Purification
• The Verse of Mutual Invocation, where the Prophet ﷺ brought Ali as “our selves”
• The Hadith of Ghadir
• The Hadith of Position (Manzilah)

Even the Abrahamic prayer, taught by the Prophet ﷺ and required in every prayer, places the family of Muhammad alongside the family of Abraham, i.e., in the rank of prophetic households.

How then can Companion-level rankings be imposed upon them?

6. Imam al-Shafi‘i’s explicit position

Imam al-Shafi‘i said:

They said: You have become a Rafidi
I said: No, rejection is neither my creed nor belief

5) A Sufi reminder: Sayyidah Rābiʿah al-ʿAdawiyyah

The Sunni spiritual inheritance rejects contempt. The early Sufi masters openly acknowledged that Allah grants deep understanding and maʿrifah to whom He wills, male or female. Sayyidah Rābiʿah’s station and words are a living refutation of those who try to turn religion into belittlement.

6) Sayyidah Fāṭimah رضي الله عنها

From Sunni fundamentals is love and reverence for the Ahl al-Bayt. Sayyidah Fāṭimah رضي الله عنها has an immensely high rank, and several Sunni scholars consider her right after the Prophet ﷺ in status, higher than all the Ṣaḥābah.

7) Two final corrections people also need to hear

First, attributing the slogan “women are half intellect” to the early generations is not their methodology. The Salaf understood texts with their intended meanings and contexts, and they did not turn the Sunnah into an insult against half of the Ummah.

Second, it is false to claim from Sunni Islam that women should be barred from beneficial knowledge, rational sciences, or higher fields. The Ummah has always had learned women, and beneficial knowledge remains beneficial knowledge. What is required is Islamic adab and proper Sharʿī boundaries, not banning women from learning and excellence.

The reality itself is a clear proof against that misreading. We have seen, and continue to see, many women excel over many men in intelligence, precision, scholarship, leadership, and wisdom. So whoever insists on interpreting the Prophet’s words ﷺ as a blanket claim of female inferiority ends up placing the ḥadīth in direct conflict with reality, making it appear as though the ḥadīth is false. But the problem is not the Prophet ﷺ. The problem is their misunderstanding. Either their interpretation is wrong, or one would have to claim the Prophet ﷺ was wrong, and that is impossible. Allah says: وما ينطق عن الهوى. Therefore, the correct conclusion is that the slogan reading is false, and the ḥadīth must be understood as the Prophet ﷺ himself explained it, within its context and intended meaning.

And Allah knows best.

***Question Received on the Channel***
____
As-salām ʿalaykum, Shaykh.
I have two questions.

Question no 1:

A certain sect often claims that all women possess “half the intellect” or have some inherent defect. This has caused considerable confusion among people. They present this as the view of the early generations and argue that certain ḥadīths support such an idea. Others even go further and insist that women should not study the rational sciences or higher fields of knowledge.

These statements have had a harmful impact on many women, leading to doubt and distress.

Kindly clarify the sound Sunni position on this issue.
_
Answer

Wa ʿalaykum as-salām wa raḥmatullāhi wa barakātuh.

1) The Sunni foundation

In Islam, men and women share the same human dignity, the same moral responsibility before Allah, and the same path to the highest ranks through īmān and taqwā. Superiority is by righteousness, not by gender.

Therefore, the blanket claim that women have an inherent defect or are “half minded by nature” is not the correct understanding. And the Prophet ﷺ said: النساء شقائق الرجال (Women are the counterparts of men), meaning they equally share the foundations of religious responsibility.

2) The ḥadīth of “nuqṣān al ʿaql wa al dīn” is not a statement of inferiority

This ḥadīth is ṣaḥīḥ, but its meaning is often abused and taken out of context to serve a chauvinistic narrative in some communities and used as an excuse to mistreat women. This is non-Islamic. The correct Islamic reading is that it explains specific rulings, not that women are inferior.

To show the context, the Prophet ﷺ said to the women:

ما رأيتُ من ناقصاتِ عقلٍ ودينٍ أذهبَ لِلُبِّ الرَّجُلِ الحازمِ من إحداكُنَّ

Notice the part people often ignore: “أذهب للب الرجل الحازم”, meaning: “more capable of overpowering the composure and judgment of a firm, decisive man.” This is not teaching contempt. It is the Prophet ﷺ addressing women directly and acknowledging a real strength Allah has placed in them: the ability to deeply influence even strong-minded men. The guidance here is to use every gift with taqwā, modesty, and responsibility, and never against the Sharīʿah.

Then the ḥadīth itself clarifies what is meant by “nuqṣān”, so it must not be turned into a slogan.

A) “Nuqṣān al ʿaql” is tied to a specific legal context

In the narration itself, the Prophet ﷺ links this meaning to a particular context of testimony arrangements in certain financial dealings, where one supports the other if forgetfulness occurs. This is a legal safeguard in a specific domain. It is not a statement about a woman’s general intelligence or her worth.

So it is a mistake to turn it into a sweeping slogan about “women’s intellect” as such.

B) “Nuqṣān al dīn” refers to legal concessions, not piety

The same ḥadīth clarifies that this refers to menstruation related rulings, where prayer is not performed and fasting is paused then made up later. This is not sin, not blame, and not spiritual inferiority. It is obedience and mercy.

3) Why two women in some testimony contexts?

The Qurʾān mentions two women witnesses in the context of debt documentation so that if one forgets or errs, the other can remind her. The wisdom is to safeguard people’s rights in a high stakes area where disputes are common, and they’re usually men domains.

Scholars also mention practical legal wisdoms behind this type of arrangement, such as:
• strengthening accuracy in formal documentation,
• protecting witnesses from intimidation or pressure in contentious disputes,
• reflecting typical exposure and experience in that specific domain in many societies.

This is a courtroom safeguard, not a claim that women are “less human” or “half intelligent.”

4) And yes: in other situations, women’s testimony is accepted on its own

Islamic evidentiary rules are not one flat rule. They vary by subject matter and legal purpose. There are situations where only women can meaningfully testify, especially in matters tied to women’s private, direct knowledge.

I think I answered all questions. If there are more questions, please type them as comments to this message.

***Question received on the channel***
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What are the types of Munāfiqīn and Fāsiqīn and who has the right to declare one a Fāsiq or a Munāfiq?
⸻

Answer:
In Sunni creed, these labels have precise meanings and dangerous misuses. So we separate between: the reality in Allah’s knowledge, and what humans can judge outwardly.

1. Types of nifāq (hypocrisy)
A) Major nifāq (nifāq iʿtiqādī)
This is inward disbelief while showing Islam outwardly. This is the nifāq of the Qur’an’s harsh warnings. Its reality is in the heart, and hearts are not accessible to us.

B) Minor nifāq (nifāq ʿamalī)
This is hypocrisy in behaviour: lying, betraying trusts, breaking promises, فجور في الخصومة, and similar traits. A person may have some of these traits and still be a Muslim, but they are in spiritual danger and must repent.

2. Types of fisq (sinful rebellion)
Fisq means departing from obedience through sin.
A) Fisq by action
Major sins, public immorality, persistent wrongdoing, and open violation of Sharia limits.

B) Fisq by ideology or stance
Holding or promoting a deviant position that clashes with clear fundamentals, especially if it leads to corrupting others. This is not for random people to declare. It needs knowledge, proof, and careful application.

3. Who can declare a person “fāsiq” or “munāfiq”?

• The general Muslim can and should judge actions: “This act is sinful”, “This claim is false”, “This behaviour is ظلم”, and advise with adab.
• Declaring an individual with a fixed label is not a casual right. It is for qualified scholarship and, in public matters, lawful authority, because it requires:
• establishing proof
• removing ambiguity
• understanding context
• weighing consequences (fitna, injustice, slander)

As for major nifāq specifically: it is not a playground for people, because it is ultimately tied to what is hidden.

4. A needed balance: yes, some scholars applied these rulings on specific figures
There are cases where scholars judged certain individuals as being from “the hypocrites” or as “fāsiq” due to strong, explicit evidence, including sound reports and clear patterns of harm. But this is precisely why it must remain:

• evidence-based
• strict in conditions
• limited to people qualified to do it
• and never turned into a populist slogan

5. Practical guidance
If you’re asking “Can I call someone a munāfiq or fāsiq?”
Most of the time: no.
Speak about the act, not the unseen of the person.

Nifāq of belief is a heart matter.
Fisq and minor nifāq can be seen in actions.
Labels on individuals require scholarship, proof, and responsibility, not zeal or arguments.

Question received on the channel
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What is the Ashʿarī–Māturīdī, Ahl al-Sunna position on whether Shayṭān can know what is in our minds?
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Answer:
In Sunni creed, Shayṭān does not know the unseen. He does not know the future, and he does not have direct access to what is hidden in the heart the way Allah does. So he cannot “read your mind” with certainty the way people imagine.

What Shayṭān can do is waswasa: he whispers suggestions, stirs desires, and exploits patterns. He watches your habits, your reactions, your weak points, your routine, and your environment, then keeps trying doors until one opens. That can feel like “he knew what I was thinking,” but it is not knowledge of the unseen. It is temptation, repetition, and psychological pressure.

If you expect a psychologist to learn your triggers after a 50 minute session, then what about Shayṭān who observes your patterns for years, watching what you click, crave, fear, and repeat? That still isn’t knowledge of the unseen. It’s pattern reading and persistence.

This is exactly why Allah says:
“Indeed, the plot of Shayṭān is weak.” (Qur’an 4:76)

His plot is weak because it is not proof, not certainty, and not control. It is only invitation and agitation. The moment you refuse to engage, seek refuge in Allah, and return to dhikr and sound action, the whisper loses momentum.

Types of “inner talk”, and what Shayṭān can and cannot touch:
1. Normal inner dialogue (self talk, daydreaming, mental rehearsal)
This is your mind processing. Shayṭān can try to interrupt it with suggestions, doubts, fears, or desires, but he does not “own” it.
2. Nafs impulses (cravings, anger, ego, anxiety)
This is where the whisper often lands, because the nafs already leans. Shayṭān pushes, decorates, and rushes you.
3. Passing thoughts (khaṭir)
A thought that appears and disappears. Not every thought is Shayṭān. Many are just mental noise. In fact, treating every thought as “a sign” is one of the traps.
4. Firm intention (niyya) and the secret between Allah and the servant
This is deeper than mental chatter. It is the settled resolve that Allah knows fully, and it is not something Shayṭān can access as unseen knowledge. He can only try to influence you before the intention settles, or tempt you after it settles, but he does not possess the unseen of hearts.

And remember: Shayṭān is an enemy, but the nafs can be more dangerous because it is inside the house.

Answer (Part 2): Why do some mashāyikh seem to lack waraʿ?

1) The word “seem” matters

A lot of this confusion comes from mixing two things:
• waraʿ as an inner reality (pious caution),and
• waraʿ as an outward style (clothing, public self-effacement, refusing praise, etc.).

The early righteous generations often expressed waraʿ through visible austerity and fleeing praise, but outward style is not one fixed mould across all times and places. So sometimes the issue is simply misreading what you see. At the end of the day, wara’ is a state of the heart.

2) Different roles produce different exposure

Many of the early righteous were not leading large public circles with disciples and gatherings in the same way later teaching circles developed. A public teacher will inevitably face:
• people praising him,
• crowds gathering,
• students becoming attached.

This does not automatically mean he lacks waraʿ. It means his test is different. His waraʿ may be in how he manages attention, redirects hearts to Allah, maintains proper boundaries, and avoids corruption.

3) Custom changes the meaning of outward signs

Not every age reads symbols the same way. In one context, rough clothing signals humility. In another, it can become a performance. This is why the masters warned against reducing the path to outward symbols.

The story of Jaʿfar al Ṣādiq

It is related in books of spiritual etiquette that Jaʿfar al Ṣādiq was criticized for wearing a fine outer garment. He showed that he wore rough wool underneath, then said in meaning:

“What is for Allah we conceal, and what is for people we display.”

So the lesson is not about fabric. The lesson is: you cannot always read inner pious caution from outward appearance. Sometimes the outward is managed with wisdom while the inner struggle is hidden.

The story of Imām Abū al Ḥasan al Shādhilī

Likewise, it is reported that Imām Abū al Ḥasan al Shādhilī was criticized by some who assumed the path is defined by rough garments. He corrected them with a strong training-style response, with a meaning like:

“My clothing tells people I do not need them, while your clothing tells them you are needy.”

Meaning: the goal is not to advertise poverty or spirituality. The goal is to purify the heart from reliance on people. Sometimes a dignified outward protects the seeker from begging, showing off, or attracting attention for the wrong reasons.

So your comparison is answered directly:
• the humility of the early righteous is true,
• but humility does not always wear the same uniform.

4) Praise has etiquette and limits

Praise is not automatically wrong, but it has rules:
• It can be acceptable when it is truthful, limited, and does not lead to exaggeration.
• It becomes harmful when it turns into excess, when gatherings revolve around a person rather than Allah and His Messenger ﷺ, and when it predictably creates confusion and harm.

We do not need to judge hearts to say this. We judge the limits and the effects.

5) Practical advice to the questioner

Here is the simple etiquette:

If you do not like a shaykh’s style, move on and look for a teacher and environment where your heart feels more at peace and your religion is protected.

Those you criticize could be:
• imposters,
• sincere people but not true inheritors of Prophetic training, so their method is incomplete,
• or a true inheritor who has his own reasons, teaching style, and ways of training his students.

In any case, it is not your role to pass verdicts about inner spiritual ranks. No one is forcing you to become his student or follow that path. Choose what is more aligned with your temperament and helps you practice with steadiness.

6) The balanced conclusion

Some mashāyikh only seem to lack waraʿ because outward forms differ by context and custom. And some truly do lack it, because every age contains imposters and people of ego. The seeker protects himself by evaluating outcomes and fruits, not by guessing hidden states.

Examples of openings without a present shaykh

Across the lived history of Muslims, you find sincere seekers who could not locate a true warith Muḥammadī in their place or time, yet Allah opened for them through help connected to the Prophet ﷺ. This can happen in forms such as:
• A true dream that strengthens repentance and steadiness.
• A powerful inner turning after prayer, Qur’an, ṣalawāt, or a night of duʿā.
• A decisive repentance that breaks attachment to sin and changes the direction of life.
• A rescue from confusion, where Allah guides the person to sound books, sound companions, and steady practice until a teacher appears later.

The point is not to reject teachers. The point is to affirm mercy:
The Prophetic nūr benefits the ummah by Allah’s permission, sometimes directly, and often through inheritors.

Two modern metaphors (life coach + dietitian)

To make this easier to relate to, think of two common modern roles:

1) A life coach (non-spiritual):
A life coach helps someone get their life in order: routines, priorities, financials, decision-making, confidence, career direction, relationships, discipline, and getting unstuck. The coach does not “live your life for you,” and doesn’t replace your responsibility. But a good coach shortens the learning curve, exposes blind spots, and keeps you accountable.

2) A dietitian or nutrition specialist:
A dietitian helps you lose weight or fix health habits. You can absolutely do it alone by reading and trying, but most people fail because of hidden mistakes, inconsistency, or lack of accountability. A specialist makes the path clearer, safer, and faster.

Now link this to the shaykh murabbī:
The shaykh of tazkiyah is like a heart coach. He helps you organize and discipline the inner life: intentions, repentance, ego patterns, heedlessness, attachment, anger, showing-off, fear, reliance, and love. You still have to pray, repent, and struggle. He does not replace your work, but he helps you see what you cannot see in yourself, and he accelerates progress by Allah’s permission.

And just like life coaching or dieting:
• You can improve without a coach, but it is usually harder, slower, and you are more likely to repeat mistakes.
• Having a true murabbī is a major advantage, but not a monopoly on Allah’s openings.

***Question received on the channel***

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As-salāmu ʿalaykum wa raḥmatullāh. Thank you for the opportunity to ask questions. My questions are:
1. What is the evidence for tawajjuh rūḥī from the Shaykh, such that the shaykh is able to do tawajjuh to a person in his absence and benefit the person thereby, and through this tawajjuh the murīd is able to ascend to higher levels of certainty and sanctity?
2. Why do mashāyikh of tasawwuf sometimes seem to lack waraʿ, while the norm among the righteous predecessors was waraʿ? For example: the shaykh allows a lot of praise in gatherings, people speak about his rank, and this feels different from the Salaf who embodied humility, fled praise, feared their end, and made no claims.
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Answer (Part 1): Tawajjuh rūḥī, the Prophetic Nūr, and benefiting in absence

1) The Prophetic Nūr and how hearts receive openings

Allah سبحانه وتعالى described the Messenger ﷺ as a light (nūr). The people of tazkiyah use this Qur’anic language to explain a lived reality:
• The Prophet ﷺ illuminated the Companions directly through suhbah, tarbiyah, and presence.
• That Prophetic nūr continues to benefit this ummah: sometimes directly by Allah’s mercy, and often through the true, established waratha Muḥammadiyya, the inheritors of Prophetic tarbiyah.

One necessary protection in wording:
This nūr is a divine gift and a created opening in hearts. It is not divinity, not incarnation, and not an independent power. The One who opens hearts is Allah, and He grants openings through causes He chooses.

2) The Companions were elevated by Prophetic presence and state

The Companions were transformed by the Prophet ﷺ through suhbah, tarbiyah, and Prophetic attention. The Prophetic nūr reached their hearts and illuminated them. The well known report of Ḥanzalah points to the extraordinary state they experienced with him, to the point that if they remained upon that state, angels would greet them openly. In meaning, the Prophet ﷺ said: if you remained on the same state you have with me, the angels would shake your hands in the roads.

This teaches a key principle for seekers:
The heart is affected not only by information, but by ḥāl and nūr by Allah’s permission.

3) What tawajjuh means in this path, and what the seeker must not get distracted by

This is why the people of the path speak of tawajjuh: a focused himmah and spiritual orientation from the shaykh to the murīd, by which Allah opens the murīd’s heart.

The true shaykh of tazkiyah is a wārith Muḥammadī, an inheritor of Prophetic tarbiyah, and a conduit through which the Prophetic nūr reaches the murīd’s heart. The shaykh does not “own” openings. He is a means through which Allah grants openings, and a mirror that helps the murīd see himself.

This also explains why benefit can occur even in absence: not as a “force” that must be systematized, but as an opening Allah grants through duʿā, himmah, sincerity, and the bond of tarbiyah.

A very important distinction:
Not every spiritual “unveiling” is beneficial. There is a difference between:
• kashf related to the unseen, which can become a distraction and a source of temptation,
• and kashf of one’s own faults, which is what truly benefits with Allah, because it pushes you to repentance and purification.

Many people become impressed by the effects of obedience, sweetness in worship, early openings, or even unusual experiences, then they stop there, and their journey to Allah gets cut off.

This is one of the strongest reasons a true murabbī is valuable: he prevents you from mistaking “effects” for “arrival.”

4) No monopoly: Allah opens by many doors, sometimes directly through the Prophet ﷺ

Even while affirming tawajjuh and the need for التربية, it is a mistake to imagine spiritual ascent has only one gatekeeper. The shaykh-murabbī is a tremendous door for many seekers, but it is not a monopoly.

On the path:
• Allah may open directly for a servant through attachment to the Prophet ﷺ, ṣalawāt, sincere duʿā, Qur’an, and repentance.
• And Allah may open through the means of a true warith Muḥammadī.